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Abstract
We introduce the notion of a stone age equilibrium to study societies in which prop-
erty rights are absent, bilateral exchange is either coercive or voluntary, and relative
strength governs power relations in coercive exchange. We stress the importance of free
disposal of goods which allows for excess holdings larger than consumption, thereby
modelling the power to withhold goods from others. Under complete, transitive, con-
tinuous and strictly-convex preferences, stone age equilibria exist. The maximum of
the lexicographic welfare function in which agents are ranked by descending strength
always corresponds to a stone age equilibrium. Every stone age equilibrium is weakly
Pareto e¢ cient.
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So Isaac left that place and encamped in the valley of Gerar, and stayed there.
Then Isaacs slaves dug in the valley and found a spring of running water, but
the shepherds of Gerar quarreled with Isaacs shepherds, claiming the water as
theirs. He called the well Esek, because they made di¢ culties for him. His men
then dug another well, but the others quarreled with him over that also, so he
called it Sitnah. He moved on from there and dug another well, but there was no
quarrel over that one, so he called it Rehoboth, saying, Now the Lord has given
us plenty of room and we shall be fruitful in the land.
Genesis 26, verse 17,19-22, The New English Bible (1970)
1 Introduction
Economics is about scarcity and conict. It analyses institutions to mitigate scarcity and to
settle conicts. The aim of this paper is to broaden the Walrasian idea of exchange through
voluntary exchange and to include coercive exchange based on power relations. Coercive ex-
change is more fundamental than voluntary exchange. The former can be envisaged without
established institutions, the latter requires generally acknowledged property rights.
This paper develops the notion of a stone age equilibrium, an equilibrium concept for an
economy with voluntary as well as coercive exchange. An allocation is a stone age equilib-
rium if no agent can force a preferred exchange and no pair of agents prefers a voluntary
exchange. Our work is inspired by but goes beyond work by Piccione and Rubinstein (2007)
who introduce the notion of a jungle equilibrium, an equilibrium that reects coercive ex-
change only. We provide a general unifying framework where the jungle equilibrium and
the Walrasian equilibrium emerge as special cases. In fact the jungle and the Walrasian
economy both adopt extreme assumptions about the power relations in the economy. On
one side Piccione and Rubinsteins jungle is extreme because a stronger agent has complete
power over a weaker agent and can take whatever he wants. The Walrasian economy is the
other extreme as no agent has any coercive power over any other agent and all exchange is
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strictly voluntary.
To x ideas, consider a society in anarchy where no social rules exist and power is
related to relative strength. Agents meet each other bilaterally and exchange their holdings.
Exchange can be either coercive or voluntary depending upon holdings and relative strength.
During an encounter, the stronger agent may take away some goods from the weaker without
consent. We call this coercive exchange. Coercive exchange is subject to limits of taking
which are specied later in Section 2.3. Furthermore, agents may voluntarily trade. The
economy is in a stone age equilibrium if no one prefers to take from another weaker agent
and there are no bilateral gains from trade. The latter means that for every two-person
economy with initial endowments !i = zi and !j = zj individual holdings (zi; zj) are on
the contract curve of this economy and, consequently, that the lens of individually rational
allocations with respect to (zi; zj) in the two-person Edgeworth box is empty.
This paper is not the rst to notice that coercive exchange is an important economic
activity. An early model of coercive exchange has been developed by Haavelmo (1954)
noticing that economic development may be governed just as much by grabbing as by
voluntary exchange. Haavelmos model, it seems, was largely ignored and did not impact
later work.1 Only with the rising interest in institutional economics models of anarchy
have received some attention. Bush (1972) and Bush and Mayer (1974) developed a model
of anarchy where agents allocate their resources to production or arms. In this model an
equilibrium establishes proto property rights which form the basis of a constitutional
contract; cf. Buchanan (1975). Skaperdas (1992) examines a similar model to spell out the
conditions for (partial) cooperation. More recent work by Bös and Kolmar (2003), Muthoo
(2004) and Hafer (2006) and others has modied and extended this approach using a repeated
game framework. Another strand of literature explores models of conict not to explain the
emergence of property rights but shifts in property rights. Examples are Grossman (1995)
who studies a model where redistribution prevents crime and Baker (2003) and Ansink and
1Haavelmos work has not been cited in the literature on anarchy and contests with the exception of the
survey paper by Garnkel and Skaperdas (2007).
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Weikard (2009) who examine land tenure and water rights contests, respectively.
Bowles and Gintis (2000) note that costless enforcement of agreements such as voluntary
exchange is one of the more implausible assumptions of the Walrasian account of exchange.
They conclude that power relations matter for understanding the economic process, insti-
tutions (why capital hires labour), and resulting allocations. Our notion of a stone age
equilibrium brings together the idea of equilibrium in conict with the idea of a Walrasian
general equilibrium. An observed allocation (provided it is an equilibrium) is not just ex-
plained as an exchange equilibrium but it is an exchange equilibrium that reects underlying
power relations. Although there is now a body of work on interaction in anarchy which helps
to better understand the impact of power relations on resource and income distributions,
the connection between general (Walrasian) equilibrium and interaction in anarchy has not
been studied. Our notion of a stone age equilibrium is trying to establish this missing link.
The next section provides a formal account of the stone age economy, describes the agents
and the limits of taking and denes the stone age equilibrium. Section 3 provides various
examples. Section 4 proves the existence of a stone age equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.
2 The stone age economy
2.1 Agents, resources, free disposal and preferences
A stone age economy consists of n agents, numbered i = 1; : : : ; n, n  2, m goods, numbered
k = 1; : : : ;m, m  1, and the economys total endowments ! 2 Rm++. Unlike in the
classical exchange economy there are no individual entitlements. The set of all agents is
N = f1; : : : ; ng. An allocation z = (z0; z1; : : : ; zn) assigns a bundle zi to each agent i, i 2 N ,
and z0 2 Rm+ expresses the endowments not allocated to any agent. We will refer to zi also
as agent is holdings. An allocation is called feasible if z0+
P
i2N z
i = !, where z0 indicates
the slack available in the economy.
At this point, it is important to realize that an individual agent is not forced to consume
all his possessions and may voluntarily dispose or waste some of the resources available to
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him. This property is called free disposal. For example, a person who successfully defends
a small well may consume only a limited amount of the wells capacity without letting
others access the water.2 So, we must distinguish between agent is possessions zi and this
agents consumption xi 2 Rm+ . Free disposal then means that xi  zi. Of course, monotonic
preferences imply xi = zi meaning no-spillage is optimal, but such preferences assume away
some interesting issues such as satiation and the power to withhold goods from other agents,
which we discuss further in Section 3. Similarly, z0  0 denes free disposal at the level of
the economy.
Allowing for free disposal implies that agent is preference relation over holdings on Rm+
that compares pairs of holdings zi and z^i must be distinguished from the preference relation
over consumption bundles on Rm+ that compares pairs of consumption xi and x^i. Of course,
these preference relations are related and should be dened in a consistent manner. We
take the preference relation over consumption, denoted %Ci , as the primitive of the stone
age economy and use it to dene the preference relation over holdings, denoted %i. We
assume that %Ci is complete, transitive, continuous and strictly convex. Note that we do not
impose monotonicity and, thus, allow for satiation. Given the holdings zi 2 Rm+ , agent is
consumption xi is a best or maximal element of %Ci on the subset xi  zi. For each zi, the
assumptions on %Ci guarantee a unique maximal element that we denote as M i(zi), which
is a continuous function of zi. The function M i (zi) denes agent is preference relation %i
on Rm+ over holdings: Whenever agent i compares the pair of holdings zi and z^i, he actually
considers the maximal consumption bundle attainable from zi to the maximal consumption
bundle from z^i. Formally, zi %i z^i if and only if M i (zi) %Ci M i (z^i). In case %Ci is also
monotonic, then M i (zi) = zi for all zi 2 Rm+ and, therefore, %i coincides with %Ci . We have
the following properties for %i.
Lemma 1 For each agent i, the preference relation %i is complete, transitive and continu-
ous.
2Access to freshwater always has been a matter of great controversy over mankinds history in arid areas.
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Proof. Since M : Rm+ ! Rm+ is a function, any two zi and z^i in Rm+ can be compared
through %Ci , which implies %i is complete. Furthermore, zi %i z^i %i ~zi if and only if
M i (zi) %Ci M i (z^i) %Ci M i (~zi), which implies %i is transitive. Next, consider the convergent
sequence fzi (k)g1k=1 such that zi (k) ! zi as k ! 1. Then, %i is said to be continuous
if zi (k) %i z^i for all k implies that zi %i z^i. Suppose zi (k) %i z^i for all k. By denition,
zi (k) %i z^i if and only ifM i (zi (k)) %Ci M i (z^i). Since the functionM is continuous, we have
thatM i (zi (k))!M i (zi) as k !1. Then, by continuity of %Ci , M i (zi (k)) %Ci M i (z^i) for
all k implies M i (zi) %Ci M i (z^i). Then also, zi %i z^i, which establishes continuity.
2.2 Relative strength
Exchange in the stone age economy is either voluntary or coercive. Coercive exchange is
driven by an allocation of goods representing control over resources, by the agentsprefer-
ences and, most importantly, by the relative strength between any pair of agents. Coercive
exchange means that one agent gains control of resources from another agent without consent
of the latter. We model power relations to capture the idea that relative strength a¤ects the
ability to take goods from others. The larger the di¤erence in strength, the easier it is for
the stronger to take goods away from the weaker.
To quantify relative strength, we introduce a vector s = (s1; : : : ; sn) 2 Rn++,
P
i2N si = 1,
with the interpretation that agent i is stronger than agent j if si > sj. Players i and j are
equally strong if si = sj. Without loss of generality we may renumber the agents such that
s1  s2  : : :  sn, which we do from here on. In what follows, we think of agent i as the
stronger agent in the arbitrary pair of agents i and j meaning j  i or si  sj. Similarly,
i  j  k where k 2 N is a third agent. Vector s denes relative strength coe¢ cients
sij =
si
sj
for any pair of agents and our normalization implies sij  1. Then, sji = s 1ij  1
and, in particular, sii = 1. Furthermore, any multiplication s = (s1; : : : ; sn),  > 0,
produces the same relative coe¢ cients sij, which justies our normalization of s to the unit
simplex. Finally, it also implies some universal measure of strength such that the relative
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strength measure between i and k is related to their relative strength measures with any
third agent in a multiplicative manner: sik = sijsjk  1, meaning relative strength induces a
transitive relation among the agents in N . Then, the matrix S = [sij] of all relative strength
coe¢ cients has diagonal elements equal to 1, upper-triangular elements that are greater than
or equal to 1 and lower-triangular elements smaller than or equal to 1.
Relative strength is employed in specifying the set of consumption bundles the stronger
agent can take away from the weaker agent. Before we discuss these issues, we rst show
how relative strength is more general than the notion of power in the jungle economy in
Piccione and Rubinstein (2007).
Remark 2 In the jungle economy in Piccione and Rubinstein (2007), the possibility of two
or more equally strong agents is ruled out, while our approach can easily accommodate this
situation when si;i+1 = 1. Moreover, the power structure in the jungle equilibrium is extreme:
The strongest in any set of agents has all the power. Such absolute power can be obtained
as a special limit case of our specication. To see this, let " > 0 be small and consider the
vector s (") with si (") = "i 1 "i, 1  i  n, and sn (") = "n 1. So, si (") > si+1 (") > 0 andPn
i=1 si (") = 1. Then we obtain the relative strength coe¢ cients si;i+1 ("), 1  i  n   1,
and its limit as " tends to 0
si;i+1 (") =
1
"
!1; 1  i  n  1:
Taking this particular limit implies that the relative strength si+1 (") of agent i+1 goes faster
to 0 than the relative strength si (") of the adjacent relative stronger agent i. If i is weaker
than j (i > j), then in the limit agent js relative strength is innitely many times larger
than is.
2.3 Coercive exchange
In the stone age economy, we picture agents roaming around as individuals and occasionally
encountering each other. During such bilateral encounter, it is natural to assume that there
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are limits in what one agent can take from the other agent since taking from another agent
is usually not a costless event in that it involves preparation and utilization of goods (e.g.
weapons).
We combine two robust ideas: First, an agent cannot take anything from a stronger or an
equally strong agent. So, when agents i and j meet (recall sij  1) agent j cannot take from
i. Second, the bundle of takings yij 2 Rm+ agent i can expropriate from the weaker agent
j depends, of course, upon the initial holdings zj and upon the relative strength sij  1.
A larger relative strength has a nondecreasing inuence upon the maximum takings from a
weaker agent. The set of feasible takings is dened by the correspondence  : Rm+1+ ! Rm+
that satises
0 2   zj; sij  yij 2 Rm+  yij  zj	
We assume that  is non-decreasing in zj and sij  1.
Recall that the distribution of strength is exogenously given and, in particular, indepen-
dent of the holdings. We are aware that in a more general set up components of holdings
zi; zj might represent tools like axes or knifes for hunting that can also be employed as
weapons that ease either takings or defence. Thus, relative strength sij would depend, in
such setting, on both zi and zj.
In our setting, instead of motivating  from the perspective of taking, we might as
well consider the set of bundles (zj; sij) that agent j is able to defend against agent i.
Then, it is natural to assume 0 2 (zj; sij) 

z^j 2 Rm+
 z^j  zj	 and to write  (zj; sij) =
yij 2 Rm+
 yij  zj	 n(zj; sij). Hence,  can be specied to reect the power of every
agent to take everything that cannot be defended. As we assume that  is non-decreasing in
sij it holds that some bundle z
j
min  (zj; sij) is a minimum set Dj  Rm+ that j can defend
against every other agent.
Before continuing, we rst relate the stone age economy to the barter economy and the
jungle economy.
Remark 3 A barter economy has fully secure property rights and bilateral exchange in quan-
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tities. It can be obtained as the special case, rst, when all agents have equal strength, that
is if sij = 1 for all i; j 2 N . Then, every agent is strong enough to defend all his holdings
against any other agent such that zj 2 (zj; sij) =

z^j 2 Rm+
 z^j  zj	 for all i; j 2 N . By
denition,  (zj; sij) = f0g for all i; j 2 N .
Remark 4 The jungle economy in Piccione and Rubinstein (2007) can be obtained as a
special case. First, preferences in the jungle economy are monotonic and, therefore, there
is no need to distinguish consumption xi from holdings zi since these always coincide in
the jungle equilibrium, i.e., xi = zi. So, under monotonic preferences %i is equivalent to
%Ci . The absence of free disposal in the Jungle Economy, however, implicitly rules out
the strategic withholding of resources from other agents without consuming. Second, in the
jungle economy agent is consumption is restricted by the consumption set X i  Rm+ , which
can also be interpreted as boundaries to individual holdings. For zi 2 X i, the jungle economy
then corresponds to the special case  (zj; sij) =

yij 2 Rm+
 yij  zj; zi + yij 2 X i	 whenever
sij > 1. This means only a slight di¤erence in strength between two agents su¢ ces for agent
i to take whatever he wants from the weaker agent j, i.e. the weaker agent cannot defend
any of her holdings whenever sij > 1.
2.4 Stone Age Equilibrium
In this subsection, we introduce the stone age economy and the stone age equilibrium.
The stone age economy is implicitly dened in the previous three subsections. For ease
of exposition, we summarize this economy in the following denition.
Denition 5 The stone age economy is dened by the set of agents N , the vector of resources
! 2 Rm++, each agents preferences %i, i 2 N , over holdings, the normalized vector of strength
coe¢ cients s 2 Rn+, and for each pair of agents a set of feasible takings  (zj; sij) that agent
i can take from agent j.
The stone age economy is an exchange economy where every interaction between agents
is conned to bilateral exchange. Hence, we envisage that two individuals with di¤erent
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holdings, strengths, and preferences will meet. Such encounter may lead to coercive or
voluntary exchange or both.
Voluntary exchange is based upon the economic principle of quid pro quo that excludes
gifts. A gift is a valuable good given to another agent without an explicit agreement to
receive something in return. Excluding or allowing gifts matters in case a satiated agent
with excess holdings meets another agent who would prefer the excess holdings but, since
the other is satiated, has nothing to o¤er in return. Quid pro quo3 implies that in this case
the agents fail to exchange altogether, whereas allowing for gifts would imply that excess
holdings are simply given as a gift. In terms of dening voluntary exchange, we interpret
quid pro quo as corresponding to bilateral exchange that makes both agents strictly better
o¤, whereas gifts correspond to bilateral exchange that makes at least one agent strictly
better o¤ and does not make the other agent worse o¤. Our denition of voluntary trade
in a stone age equilibrium is based upon quid pro quo because we think that it better ts
a society based upon power relations where holdings may be taken from you and nothing is
given away for free. In terms of Pareto improving exchange, only voluntary exchanges that
are weakly Pareto improving are considered under quid pro quo.4 In Section 3.5, we briey
discuss the case of allowing for gifts.
Having dened the stone age economy, we can now dene its equilibrium concept. The
stone age economy is in equilibrium if no pair of agents prefers further exchange. This
concept combines both coercive and voluntary exchange into one equilibrium concept.
Denition 6 A stone age equilibrium is a feasible allocation z = (z0; z1; : : : ; zn), zi 2 Rm+ ,
for the stone age economy such that
1. Coercive exchange: There does not exist an alternative bundle zi + yi0 + yij i zi such
that yi0  z0 and yij 2 (zj; sij).
3Quid pro quo is Latin for the English expression that a good turn deserves another.
4Weak Pareto e¢ ciency of allocation z is dened as: there does not exist a z^ such that for all i = 1; : : : ; n
it holds that z^ Ci z. Strong Pareto e¢ ciency has Ci instead of Ci with at least one strict preference.
Strong Pareto e¢ ciency implies weak Pareto e¢ ciency, but not the other way around.
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2. Voluntary exchange: There does not exist a bilateral reallocation (~zi; ~zj) such that ~zi i
zi and ~zji j zj satisfying ~zi + ~zj  zi + zj.
3. Utility maximization under free disposal: Agent is consumption xi is a maximal ele-
ment of %Ci on the subset xi  zi.
Before we analyze the equilibrium we argue that the stone age equilibrium generalizes
both the Walrasian and the jungle equilibrium in Piccione and Rubinstein (2007).
Remark 7 A Walrasian equilibrium (p; x1; : : : ; xn) emerges as a special case when (zj; sij)
= f0g for all i; j 2 N , and agents exchange on markets against uniform market prices. This
happens if agents have equal strength, that is if sij = 1; or if every agent is strong enough
to defend all his holdings against any other agent such that (zj; sij) =

z^j 2 Rm+
 z^j  zj	
for all i; j 2 N . Or equivalently, (zj; sij) = f0g. Hence, property rights are fully secure,
and only voluntary exchange takes place.
Remark 8 The stone age equilibrium extends the jungle equilibrium in Piccione and Ru-
binstein (2007). To see this, the jungle equilibrium assumes (zj; sij) = fyij 2 Rm+ jyij  zj;
zi + yij 2 X ig for all zi 2 X i, %i equivalent to %Ci and utility maximizing agents. So, the
stone age economy equilibrium allows for voluntary exchange and free disposal, while both
activities are excluded from the jungle economy. The conditions for coercive exchange and
utility maximization extend the conditions under the jungle equilibrium to accommodate for
free disposal.
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3 Stone age equilibrium
In this section, we rst establish existence, and then, we characterize the stone age equilib-
rium.
3.1 Existence
The jungle equilibrium in Piccione and Rubinstein (2007) coincides with the maximum of
the lexicographic welfare function, where the order of lexicographic maxima is the order of
agents in the jungle economy ranked from strongest to weakest. The next result shows that
this lexicographic maximum always is a stone age equilibrium. Since this maximum always
exists, we automatically establish the existence of the stone age equilibrium.
Proposition 9 Let (x1; : : : ; xn), xi 2 Rm+ , be the maximum of the lexicographic welfare
function in which the order of maximizing this preference relation is %C1 ;%C2 ; : : : ; %Cn , xj 
!  Pj 1i=1 xi, j = 1; : : : ; n, and let x0 = !  Pni=1 xi. Then, z = (x0; x1; : : : ; xn) exists, is
unique and is a stone age equilibrium in which M i (zi) = xi for all i = 1; : : : ; n. Hence,
every stone age economy has a stone age equilibrium.
Proof. The proof consists of verifying that the conditions of Denition 6 hold for z =
(x0; x1; : : : ; xn). We start with Condition 1. Recall the denition of M j (zj) and that M j is
a continuous function. Then, in iteration j = 1; : : : ; n, the lexicographic maximum exists, is
unique and satises xj =M j

!  Pj 1i=1 xi. For any j  n  1 and k > j, we have that
xj + yjk  xj + xk  !  
Xj 1
i=1
xi
and, by weak monotonicity of M j, this implies
xj =M j

!  
Xj 1
i=1
xi

%Cj M j
 
xj + xk

%Cj M j
 
xj + yjk

:
So, j prefers not to take from agent k > j. Similar, for any j, we have that
xj + x0  !  
Xj 1
i=1
xi =) xj =M j

!  
Xj 1
i=1
xi

%Cj M j
 
xj + x0

:
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So, agent i does not prefer to utilize the economys slack z0 = x0. Therefore, z satises
Condition 2. Next, since z = (x0; x1; : : : ; xn) is the maximum of the lexicographic welfare
function, it is strongly Pareto e¢ cient. Hence, no strongly (hence, no weakly either) Pareto
improving bilateral exchange exists and Condition 2 also holds. Finally, zi = xi and xi =
M i (xi) implies xi =M i (zi) and, thus, condition 3 holds. To summarize, z = (x0; x1; : : : ; xn)
satises the conditions of Denition 6 and is a stone age equilibrium. Recall each xj, j =
1; : : : ; n, exists and is unique. Hence, the stone age equilibrium exists.
In Piccione and Rubinstein (2007), the jungle equilibrium coincides with the maximum
of the lexicographic welfare function. So, although the relative strength between any pair
of agents in a jungle economy is extreme, the jungle equilibrium allocation survives under
less extreme strength relations, more restrictive correspondences  of feasible takings, and
the possibility of voluntary exchange. The rationale is that the underlying fundamental
asymmetry, namely agent i might take from agent j but never vice versa, is preserved in
the stone age economy even in case the di¤erence in relative strength is small, i.e., sj  si
or even vanishes by taking the limit s !   1
n
; : : : ; 1
n

. This result is independent of the
correspondence .
3.2 Characterization
In this subsection, we provide a characterization of stone age equilibria.
For the following result, we dene agent is set of coercive takings (T ) that are strictly
preferred to no-taking as
T i
 
zi

=

yij 2 Rm+ jM i
 
zi + yij
 Ci M i  zi	 :
Proposition 10 If z = (z0; z1; : : : ; zn) is a stone age equilibrium, then
1. for each agent i 2 f1; : : : ; ng and good k 2 f1; : : : ;mg such that M ik (zi) < zik: agent i
is satiated in good k.
2. for each good k 2 f1; : : : ;mg such that z0k > 0: all agents are satiated in good k.
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3. for each agent i and agent j, i;2 f1; : : : ; ng: T i (zi) \  (zj; sij) = ;.
4. for each pair i and i0, i; i0 2 f1; : : : ; ng: (M i (zi) ;M i0(zi0)) is weakly Pareto e¢ cient
in a two-agent barter economy with total endowments zi + zi
0
and preference relations
%Ci and %Ci0 .
Proof. First, consider M ik (z
i) < zik. Since agent is consumption M
i (zi) is the maximal
element of %Ci , this agent prefers to dispose zik  M ik (zi) > 0 units of good k. Hence, agent
i is satiated in good k.
Second, consider the slack z0k > 0 for good k. For 0 < "  z0k, consider agent is increased
holdings z^i = zi + "ek  zi, where ek denotes the k-th unit vector. Since z^i  zi  M i (zi),
the bundle M i (zi) is also feasible under z^i and, therefore, M i (z^i) %Ci M i (zi). Then, by
denition of %i and z is a stone age equilibrium, we also have that
zi %i z^i ()M i
 
zi

%Ci M i
 
z^i

:
So, M i (z^i) Ci M i (zi). Since the only di¤erence between z^i and zi is the increased amount
of good k, agent i is indi¤erent between whether or not to have holdings over this extra
amount of good k. Hence, agent i is satiated in good k. This must hold for all agents i.
Third, consider a bilateral encounter by agents i and j. z is a stone age equilibrium
implies zi %i zi + yij for all yij 2  (zj; sij). So, yij =2 T i (zi). Hence, the intersection of
 (zj; sij) and yij 2 T i (zi) must be empty.
Fourth, by denition of voluntary exchange: There does not exist a bilateral reallocation
(~zi; ~zi
0
) such that ~zi i zi and ~zi0 i0 zi0 satisfying ~zi + ~zi0  zi + zi0. So, (zi; zi0) is weakly
Pareto e¢ cient in the two-agent exchange economy with total endowments zi + zi
0
and
preference relations %i and %j. Next, ~zi i zi and ~zi0i0  zi0 translate as M i (~zi) Ci M i (zi),
respectively,M i
0
(~zi
0
) Ci0 M i0(zi0). In other words, there does not exist a bilateral reallocation
(~zi; ~zi
0
) such that M i (~zi) Ci M i (zi) and M i0(~zi0) Cj M i0(zi0) satisfying ~zi + ~zi0  zi + zi0.
So, (M i (zi) ;M i
0
(zi
0
)) is weakly Pareto e¢ cient in the two-agent exchange economy with
total endowments zi + zi
0
and preference relations %Ci and %Ci0 .
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In case of monotonic preference relations %Ci , we obtain sharper results. Since monotonic
preferences rule out satiation, it is impossible to have unallocated goods, i.e., z0 = 0. Fur-
thermore, every increase in at least one of the commodities improves agent is utility and,
therefore, T i (zi) is equal to Rm+n f0g. Condition 2 simplies to agent i failing positive net
expansions at allocation z, i.e.,  (zj; sij) = f0g. Finally, condition 3 reduces to (zi; zi0) lies
on the contract curve of a two-agent barter economy with total endowments zi + zi
0
and
preference relations %Ci and %Ci0 .
Corollary 11 If all preference relations are monotonic, then z = (z0; z1; : : : ; zn) is a stone
age equilibrium if and only if z0 = 0,  (zj; sij) = f0g, and for each pair i and i0, i; i0 2
f1; : : : ; ng: (zi; zi0) is weakly Pareto e¢ cient in a two-agent barter economy with total en-
dowments zi + zi
0
and preference relations %Ci and %Ci0 .
We conclude this section with examples. The rst examples shows that, depending
upon the parameter values, the set of stone age equilibria can either coincide with the entire
contract curve of a two-agent barter economy or the jungle equilibrium. The second example
shows that intermediate results can also be obtained.
Example 12 Consider a two-agent stone age economy with two goods, monotonic prefer-
ences, and resources !. Let

 
z2; s12

=

y12 2 R2+
 y12  c (s12)  z2	 ;
where c (s12) = maxf0; a   1s12g and a < 1. Then,  (z2; s12) = f0g whenever s12  a 1
and otherwise  (z2; s12) is a rectangular with lower-left corner 0 and upper-right corner the
fraction c (s12) of z2. In case s12  a 1, direct application of our results for monotonic
preferences implies that z0 = 0.  (z2; s12) = f0g implies that there will be no coercive
exchange and that the set of stone age equilibria is fully determined by condition 3. This
yields the entire contract curve. In the remaining case, s12 > a 1,  (z2; s12) 6= f0g with the
exception of z2 = 0. So, only z1 = ! and z2 = 0 can be part of a stone age equilibrium. In
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this case, the stone age equilibrium coincides with the lexicographic maximum, i.e. the jungle
equilibrium.
Example 13 Consider a three-agent stone age economy with two goods, monotonic prefer-
ences, s1 : s2 : s3 = 3 : 2 : 1 and resources !. Let

 
zj; sij

=

yij 2 R2+
 yij  c (sij)  zj	 ;
where c (sij) = maxf0; 12   1sij g. Then,  (z2; s12) =  (z3; s23) = f0g and  (z3; s13) =
yij 2 R2+
 yij  1
6
zj
	
. Direct application of Corollary 11 implies: z0 = 0;  (z2; s12) = f0g
rules out coercive trade between agents 2 and 3;  (z3; s23) = f0g rules out coercive trade
between 2 and 3; and  (z3; s13) 6= f0g unless z3 = 0 combined with monotonic preferences for
agent 1 implies z3 = 0. The traditional contract curve for an exchange economy with agents
1 and 2 and total endowments ! determines the set of stone age equilibria. Denote the latter
contract curve as C (!), then z = (0; z1; z2; 0), (z1; z2) 2 C (!), is a stone age equilibrium.
The stone age equilibrium z = (0; !; 0; 0) coincides with the lexicographic maximum, i.e.
the jungle equilibrium. This example illustrates that coercive exchange may reduce the set of
weakly Pareto e¢ cient allocations. It also shows that stone age equilibria may be non-unique.
3.3 Pareto e¢ ciency
An important issue is Pareto e¢ ciency of stone age equilibria. In this subsection we address
this issue.
Recall that voluntary trade based upon quid pro quo is Pareto improving in the weak
Pareto sense. For that reason, we investigate weakly Pareto e¢ ciency of stone age equilibria
and nd the following a¢ rmative answer.
Proposition 14 A stone age equilibrium z = (z0; z1; : : : ; zn) is weakly Pareto e¢ cient.
Proof. Suppose the stone age equilibrium z = (z0; z1; : : : ; zn) is not weakly Pareto
e¢ cient. Although z = (z0; z1; : : : ; zn) is pairwise weakly Pareto e¢ cient there exists, by
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assumption, an allocation z^ = (z^0; z^1; : : : ; z^n) such that M i (z^i) Ci M i (zi) for all agents
i = 1; : : : ; n. Then, M i (z^i) Ci M i (zi) implies M i (z^i) 6=M i (zi). Since z is pairwise weakly
Pareto e¢ cient, no pair i and i0, i; i0 2 f1; : : : ; ng, can realize (~zi; ~zi0) = (M i (z^i) ;M i0(z^i0)) in
their pair. Note that (~zi; ~zi
0
) is the most e¢ cient way of allocating goods in order to achieve
(M i (z^i) ;M i
0
(z^i
0
)). Therefore, it cannot hold that ~zi + ~zi
0  zi + zi0 for any pair i and i0.
Summing over all i; i0 2 f1; : : : ; ng such that i0 > i implies that
Not
nX
i;i0=1;i0>i

~zi + ~zi
0


nX
i;i0=1;i0>i

zi + zi
0

() Not ~z0  z0;
where the equivalence is due to
Pn
i;i0=1;i0>i
 
zi + zi
0
= (n  1)Pni=1 zi = (n  1) (!   z0)
and a similar equality for ~z. Then, for all goods k in z such that z0k = 0, ~z
0  0 implies
~z0k  z0k. So, not ~z0  z0 requires at least one good  = 1; : : : ;m for which 0  ~z0 < z0
holds, i.e. good  is satiated in z. For this good,
Pn
i=1 ~z
i
 = !   ~z0 > !   z0 =
Pn
i=1 z
i

implies that the consumption of the satiated good  has to increase, a contradiction. So, z
must be weakly Pareto e¢ cient.
This results states that the pairwise weakly Pareto e¢ ciency in Proposition 10 is enough
for weakly Pareto e¢ ciency of the entire economy. A stone age equilibrium may fail strongly
Pareto e¢ ciency, as the following example illustrates.
Example 15 Consider a two-agent stone age economy with m goods, total resources !,
agent 1 is satiated at z1 < !, and agent 2 has monotonic preferences. For c > 0, let

 
z2; s12

=

y12 2 R2+
 y12  c  z2	 :
Then,  (z2; s12) 6= f0g unless z2 = 0. By denition of the satiation point, T 1 (z1) = ;
whenever z1  z1. So, for all feasible z = (z0; z1; z2) such that z1  z1, we have that
T 1 (z1)\ (z2; s12) = ;. Any such z is also robust against voluntary trade. To see this: For
z1  z1 and z1 6= z1, there does not exist any feasible z^ that can make agent 1 strictly better
o¤. So, according to our denition, voluntary exchange is impossible in case agent 1 has
excess holdings above his satiation point z1 even though giving up some or all of these excess
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holdings would make agent 2 strictly better o¤. This means that all z such that z1  z1 and
z1 6= z1 are stone age equilibria in which agent 1 withholds goods from agent 2. These stone
age equilibria are weakly Pareto e¢ cient, but not strongly Pareto e¢ cient.
3.4 Uniqueness
For monotonic preferences, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions such that the maximum
of the lexicographic welfare function is the unique stone age equilibrium is that for every
pair i and j we have  (zj; sij) 6= f0g for all (zi; zj) on the pairwise Pareto frontier whenever
zj 6= 0. For non-monotonic preferences,  (zj; sij) 6= f0g for such (zi; zj) is not su¢ cient and
additionally requires that agent i also prefers at least one such coercive exchange in order to
upset such allocation.
In general, stone age economies allow for large sets of stone age equilibria, as Example 13
shows. Some may criticize the stone age equilibrium concept for that, but we think it is rather
natural. In the absence of coercive trade, hunter-gatherer economies with voluntary trade
can have many equilibria depending upon who nds which quantities of the goods rst. So,
in terms of the traditional Edgeworth box, the initial endowments could be anything before
exchange leads agents to a point on the contract curve. Also the lack of markets with uniform
market prices, like in a Walrasian economy, provides more freedom in allocating goods across
the economy. Nevertheless, coercive trade generally reduces the number of allocations that
can be a stone age equilibrium, but as our results show, this can only be the case when
the di¤erences in relative strength are large enough such that a stronger player can take
something from any weaker agent. In the extreme case, only lexicographic maximum, i.e.,
the jungle equilibrium, can survive. In case the di¤erence in strength are relatively small
such that agents cannot take from each other, voluntary exchange is the only thing they can
rely on.
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3.5 Gifts and the stone age equilibrium
The stone age equilibrium assumes voluntary exchange based upon quid pro quo that ex-
cludes gifts. In this subsection, we investigate allowing for gifts in which satiated agents
voluntarily give away excess holdings of goods for nothing in return.
Voluntary exchange with gifts implies the following modication to Condition 2 of De-
nition 6:
2. Voluntary exchange: There does not exist a bilateral reallocation (~zi; ~zj) such that ~zi %i zi
and ~zj %i zj with at least one strict preference satisfying ~zi + ~zj  zi + zj.
We call the modied equilibrium a stone age equilibrium with the possibility of gifts.
Modifying Proposition 10 implies the following strengthening of earlier results.
Proposition 16 If z = (z0; z1; : : : ; zn) is a stone age equilibrium with the possibility of gifts,
then
1. for each agent i 2 f1; : : : ; ng and good k 2 f1; : : : ;mg: M ik (zi) < zik implies all agents
are satiated in good k.
2. for each good k 2 f1; : : : ;mg such that z0k > 0: all agents are satiated in good k.
3. for each agent i and agent j, i; i0 2 f1; : : : ; ng: T i (zi) \  (zj; sij) = ;.
4. If for the pair i and i0, i; i0 2 f1; : : : ; ng: (M i (zi) ;M i0(zi0)) is strongly Pareto e¢ cient
in a two-agent exchange economy with total endowments zi+zi
0
and preference relations
%Ci and %Ci0 . Moreover, then necessarily M i(zi+ zi
0 M i0(zi0)) =M i (zi) and M i0(zi+
zi
0  M i(zi)) =M i0(zi0).
Proof. Conditions 2 and 3 are the same as in Proposition 10. Next, we proof condition
4. For each pair i and i0, i; i0 2 f1; : : : ; ng: (M i (zi) ;M i0(zi0)) is strongly Pareto e¢ cient
in a two-agent exchange economy with total endowments zi + zi
0
and preference relations
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%Ci and %Ci0 . By denition, M i (zi)  zi and M i0(zi0)  zi0. Possibly, there is some slack
in excess holdings zi  M i (zi)  0 and zi0  M i0(zi0)  0. A feasible voluntary trade is
to transfer one agents entire slack to the other agent, which does not negatively a¤ect the
well-being of the giver and might improve the well-being of the receiver. If (M i (zi) ;M i
0
(zi
0
))
is pairwise strongly Pareto e¢ cient, then by denition such transfer should not be Pareto
improving. Consider the feasible reallocation (~zi; ~zi
0
) = (zi + zi
0  M i0(zi0);M i0(zi0)), where
player i receives player i0s slack. Note that M(~zi
0
) = ~zi
0 Ci0 M
 
zi
0
and ~zi  zi. By
weak monotonicity of M (), we have M (~zi)  M (zi). Either M (~zi) = M (zi) implies
M (~zi) Ci M (zi) and, therefore, (zi; zi0) is strongly Pareto e¢ cient with respect to %Ci and
%Ci0 . Or M (~zi) 6=M (zi) and strict convexity of %Ci imply M (~zi) Ci M (zi) and, therefore,
(zi; zi
0
) is not strongly Pareto e¢ cient with respect to %Ci and %Ci0 . So, given (zi; zi
0
) is
strongly Pareto e¢ cient with respect to %Ci and %Ci0 , it is necessary that M i (~zi) = M i (zi).
By interchanging i and i0 we obtain M(zi + zi
0  M (zi)) =M(zi0).
Finally, consider M ik (z
i) < zik. then, agent i is satiated and has positive excess holdings
in good k. There cannot be an agent i0 6= i that is nonsatiated in good k, because by
the previous arguments a gift from agent i to agent i0 would be a pairwise strongly Pareto
improvement. This shows condition 1.
The conditions state that receiving the most generous voluntary exchange, i.e. a gift, in
which one agent gives up his entire slack of excess holdings to the other agent in return for
nothing, should not make the receiving player better o¤ in equilibrium. In case there is a
slack of some good, say good k, it must be the case that both agents should be satiated in
good k even though the receiving player may not have any excess holdings for this good.
Since this condition should hold across all pairs of agents, all agents will be satiated in good
k whenever
Pn
i=1M
i
k (z
i) < !k. To put it di¤erently, as long as there is a single agent that is
nonsatiated in good k, the stone age equilibrium with the possibility of gifts demands that
all the other agentsexcess holdings of good k are voluntarily given to the nonsatiated agent
as a gift. For monotonic preferences, M i (zi) = zi and M i
0
(zi
0
) = zi
0
implies that there can
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be no slack and that the conditions trivially hold.
The power to withhold is an empty threat in stone age economies with the possibility of
gifts. Strong Pareto e¢ cient allocations allow for excess holding in satiated goods, but only
in trivial cases where there is an abundance of goods to satiate all agents. The following
example illustrates these issues, which we do not further discuss.
Example 17 Consider stone age economy with two agents of equal strength, sij = 1; two
goods, total resources ! = (3; 2), and identical preferences %Ci , i = 1; 2, such that z^i %Ci zi
if and only if   (z^i1   1)2 + z^i2    (zi1   1)2 + zi2. Agent i is satiated in good 1 if zi1  1 and
has excess holdings zi1   1  0. The set of strongly Pareto e¢ cient holdings z = (z0; z1; z2)
is given by z1 = (; ), z2 = (; 2  ) and z0 = (3    ; 0), where ;   1,  +   3
and 0    2. Since good 1 is in excess of both agents satiation levels, any distribution
over holdings is strongly Pareto e¢ cient as long as both satiation levels are met. Let

 
z2; s12

=

(0; y)j 0  y  maxf1
2
; z22g
	
:
Then, any stone age equilibria z = (z0; z1; z2) is Pareto e¢ cient and the no-coercive trade
condition additional imposes   1
2
.
3.6 Concluding remarks
This paper o¤ers a unied framework to study coercive and voluntary exchange. Our study
is motivated by the fact that secure property rights, as assumed in the Walrasian economy, is
rather the exception than the rule. Our model allows for coercive exchange driven by power
relations that are absent in the Walrasian framework. In our model agents are characterized
by their relative strength as well as by their preferences.
Our contribution is mainly conceptual. We introduce the notion of a stone age equilibrium
in the context of an exchange economy and we abstract from production. In a stone age
equilibrium no agent can take goods from any other agent and no pair of agents is willing
to trade. Our model contains the Walrasian exchange economy and the jungle economy
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described by Piccione and Rubinstein (2007) as special cases. We obtain the Walrasian
economy if the agents are equally strong such that no agent can take goods from others. The
jungle economy is obtained as the other extreme when power relations are a strict ordering
and a stronger agent can take everything away from any weaker agent. We nd that the
maximum of the lexicographical welfare function, i.e., the jungle equilibrium, is a robust
equilibrium in all settings.
Novel is that we not only consider the relative power to take but also investigated the
power to withhold resources to other agents. This power is nicely demonstrated in a stone
age economy with a quid pro quo culture. It is also clear that withholding goods by satiated
individuals is not (strongly) Pareto e¢ cient in case other agents are nonsatiated in that
good. Evolution may drift society towards gifts in good times and there does not seem to
be any evolutionary pressure during bad times. There is however some reason for caution,
withholding goods may serve some strategic goal, like a parents withholding a of a candy
from a child to induce good behavior. Strategic considerations of withholding and giving are
not incorporated in our notion of a stone age equilibrium.
The discussion of quid pro quo and the possibility of gifts reects the scientic fact that
the typical hunter-gatherer society does not exists. As Bowles (2009) remarks: whether
ancestral humans were largely peacefulor warlike remains controversial. In any case,
giving gifts is part of many cultures, see e.g. Ythier (2006). From our theoretical framework
it is clear that the possibility of gifts allows for voluntary exchange that is pairwise strongly
Pareto improving while any quid pro quo culture is only pairwise weakly Pareto improving.
Therefore, economies based upon the gift culture are somewhat more e¢ cient (and friendlier)
than economies based upon quid pro quod. In future research, it seems more realistic to
consider willingness to give gifts as attitudes of individual agents, similar to say risk attitudes,
and consider societies with heterogeniety in these attitudes.
22
4 References
Ansink, Erik / Weikard, Hans-Peter (2009) Contested water rights. European Journal of
Political Economy 25, 247-260.
Baker, Matthew J. (2003) An Equilibrium Conict Model of Land Tenure in Hunter-
Gatherer Societies. Journal of Political Economy 111(1), 124-173.
Bowles, Samuel (2009) Did Warfare Among Ancestral Hunter-Gatherers A¤ect the Evo-
lution of Human Social Behaviors? Science 324, (5 June 2009), 1293-1298.
Bowles, Samuel / Gintis, Herbert (2000) Walrasian Economics in retrospect. The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 115(4), 1411-1439.
Bös, Dieter / Kolmar, Martin (2003) Anarchy, e¢ ciency, and redistribution. Journal of
Public Economics 87, 2431-2457.
Buchanan, James M. (1975) The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bush, Winston C. (1972) Individual Welfare in Anarchy. In: Tullock, Gordon (ed., 1972)
Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy. Blacksburg, Virginia: Center for the Study of Public
Choice. 5-18.
Bush, Winston C. / Mayer Lawrence S. (1974) Some Implications of Anarchy for the
Distribution of Property. Journal of Economic Theory 8, 401-412.
Garnkel, Michelle R. / Skaperdas, Stergios (2007) Economics of Conict: An Overview.
In: Sandler, Todd / Hartley, Keith (eds., 2007) Handbook of Defense Economics, Vol 2.
649-709.
Grossman, Herschel I. (1995) Robin Hood and the redistribution of property income.
European Journal of Political Economy 11, 399-410.
Hafer, Catherine (2006) On the Origins of Property Rights: Conict and Production in
the State of nature. Review of Economic Studies 73, 119-143.
Haavelmo, Trygve (1954) A Study in the Theory of Economic Evolution. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
23
Muthoo, Abhinay (2004) A model of the origin of basic property rights. Games and
Economic Behavior 49, 288-312.
Piccione, Michele / Rubinstein, Ariel (2007) Equilibrium in the Jungle. Economic Journal
117(July), 883-896.
Skaperdas, Stergios (1992) Cooperation, Conict and Power in the Absence of Property
Rights. American Economic Review 82, 720-739.
Ythier, Jean Mercier (2006) The Economic Theory of Gift-Giving: Perfect substitutabil-
ity of Transfers and Redistribution of Wealth. In: Kolm, Serge-Christophe / Ythier, Jean
Mercier (ed., 2006) Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity. Vol 1:
Foundations. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 227-369.
24
